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The Pretrial Proceeding With
Special Reference to the
Kentucky Court of Inquiry
By KFNE E. VANANDNGHAm*
During July, 1968, a public inquiry conducted by the county
judge of Fayette County, Kentucky, into charges of bribery in-
volving the chairman of the Lexington-Fayette County Planning
Commission and persons having business connected therewith,
focused widespread attention within the state upon a long-
authorized, but seldom used and consequently little known, pro-
cedural device for ferreting out public wrongdoing; namely, the
pretrial proceeding known in Kentucky as the court of inquiry.,
As noted by a federal district court,
Court of Inquiry are (sic) an old institution of the military establish-
ment of the United States ... Unlike court-martial, the proceedings of
0 Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky. A.B., 1942,
M.A., 1945, Kentucky; Ph.D Illinois, 1950.
By inquiring from state attorneys general and by searching state statutes
himself, the author has made a diligent effort to locate all statutes in the United
States which authorize this pretrial proceeding. This proceeding is a general pre-
liminary investigation designed to discover commission of crimes or public offenses
and to identify offenders. It is authorized under different names in various states.
In Kentucky and Texas it is called "court of inquiry," in Kansas "inquisition," in
Michigan 'one-man grand jury," in Vermont "inquest" and in Wisconsin "John
Doe Proceedings." In this article, however, it is referred to merely as the pretrial
proceeding.
Statutes which authorize judicial investigations wherein a specific person is
named in a complaint, such as those of Utah and North Dakota, are intentionally
excluded for the reason that, by their nature, they do not involve general investi-
gation. For more adequate definition and description of the pretrial proceeding, see
infra, "Nature of the Pretrial Proceeding." Another compilation of states which
authorized this proceeding as of 1945 is found in Winters, The Michigan One-
Man Grand Jury, 28 J. Amf. JuD. Soc'Y 137 (1945). The author wishes to ex-
ress his appreciation to all those who supplied him with information. Responsi-
ility, however, for all conclusions drawn, and for all errors are his own.
The term "court of inquiry" is used to denote the pretrial proceeding in
Kentucky very likely for the reason that. prior to 1850, courts of inquiry were
authorized in the state in connection with the state militia. Military courts of in-
quiry in Kentucky appear to have been accusatorial in nature, and were em-
powered to assess fines. Those accused before them were permitted to cross-
examine and to interrogate witnesses. See F. LoUGnoroucr, A DIGEST OF THE
STATUTE LAWS OF KEN'rucx, tit. 74, §§ 44-47 (1837).
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courts of inquiry do not involve a trial of issues in which anyone is
formally a party. Their traditional function, both in this country and in
England, has been to investigate and advise whether further proceedings
shall be had.
An old case in the Court of Claims [Walter B. Chester's Owners v.
United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 681, 683 (1884)] sums up the purpose of
courts of inquiry...
A naval or military court of inquiry is not a judicial tribunal. It is in-
stituted solely for the purpose of investigation... There is no issue joined
between parties, and its proceedings are not judicial. United States v.
Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 743 (S.D. Calif. 1953).
Although little known within the state, the Kentucky court of
inquiry is not unique in the United States, inasmuch as similar
inquisitorial agencies are authorized under different names in at
least nine additional states.2
Most of these agencies for inquisitorial or pretrial proceedings
were authorized during either the last century, or the first quarter
of the present century, although Kentucky's is among the few
predating adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The Connecticut proceeding is indicative of the
age of some authorizing acts, as it originated in a 1781 statute.
The Wisconsin proceeding, which was first authorized in the
Revised Statutes of the Territory of 1839, is believed by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court to have been perhaps borrowed from a
New York statute of 1828.4
2 A=z. REV. STAT. ANN., RuLEs OF CRim. PRocED., Rule 1B (1956); GFN.
STAT. OF CoNN., tit. 9, ch. 150 § 9-346 (1961); tit. 54, ch. 960, § 54-47 (1953);
KAN. STAT. ANN., § 62.301 (1923); MicH. CoMa. LAws ANN., CODE OF Cmin.
PRocED., § 767.3 et. seq. (1927); OKr&. STAT. ANN., § 21-951 (1916); 37-83
(1910) (investigations of violations of liquor and gambling laws only); S. DAx.
CoMp. LAws ANN., §§ 23-20-10 and 23-20-11 (1960); VERNON'S TEXAS STAT.
ANN., CODE OF CIUM. PaocED., chap. 52 (1965); VT. STAT. ANN., §§ 13-5131
through 13-5137 (1947); Wis. STAT. ANN., Cnm. PnocED., § 954.025 (1955).
3 Laws and Acts of 1731, ch. 70. "An Act for Requiring the Justices, Grand
Jurors, etc., in every town in the Colony to meet together twice in a Year, to
advise what may be most proper to suppress Vice and Immorality." See also Mc-
Carthy v. Clancy, 110 Conn. 482, 148 A. 551 (1930), in which the development
of the Connecticut pretrial proceeding is discussed.
4 State v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288, 44 N.W. 13 (1889). The history of the Wis-
consin proceeding is discussed in this opinion. Whatever may have been the past
situation in New York state, the pretrial proceeding is no longer judicially per-
mitted there because it is not authorized by statute. Concerning the lack of
judicial authority to conduct such a proceeding in that state, the New York
Supreme Court has commented: "To the grand jury, and to it alone is given the
power of investigation without a definite charge. The secrecy of the grand jury
(Continued on next page)
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Inasmuch as no statistics are available, it is impossible to know
how widely the proceeding has been conducted in any state; but
in most states it appears to have been held only infrequently. Wis-
consin, however, has used it quite often, 5 and Michigan has
evidently employed it on numerous occasions.' Although Texas
appears to have utilized courts of inquiry rather seldomly, the
device has been used to investigate such important cases as the
Billie Sol Estes case. It was intended to have been used to in-
vestigate the assassination of President John F. Kennedy until the
Warren Commission was appointed.' Save for the Lexington-
Fayette Planning Commission case, there is apparently only one
other instance wherein it has been used in Kentucky during the
past fifty years." Moreover, no case involving the county judge's
holding a court of inquiry has ever been for review before the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
I. Tim NATuRE OF T=E PRBTRAL PROCEEDING
By whatever name it is called, the pretrial proceeding is a
general preliminary investigation not directed against a specific
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
prevents injury to reputations from roving investigators." In re Both, 200 App.
Div. 423,-, 192 N.Y.S. 822, 825 (Sup. Ct. 1922). The pretrial proceeding is
also judicially forbidden in Utah. See State v. Brady, 18 Utah 2d 434, 425 P.2d
155 (1967). This opinion apparently holds that, when a specific individual is
named in a complaint, no "John Doe" or general preliminary investigation can
be conducted. On the basis of this decision, it seems that a general preliminary
investigation cannot be conducted in North Dakota either. For the North Dakota
statute, see N. D. Crr. CODE, § 29-05-03 (1943).
5 Letter from Robert W. Warren, Attorney General of Wisconsin, to Kenneth
E. Vanlandingham, Feb. 3, 1969.
6 Although no recent statistics are available, as of 1945, an estimated average
of fifty cases per year were conducted in Michigan. See Winters, The Michigan
One-Man Grand Jury, 28 J. AM. Ju-. Socy 137, 141 (1945). This article, which
presents a favorable view of the one-man grand jury, traces its development in
Michigan. For a reply to it and a critical view of the one-man grand jury, see
Gallagher, The One-Man Grand Jury-A Reply, 29 J. AM. Jun. Socy 20 (1945).7 See In re McClelland, 260 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
8 This case involved a court of inquiry conducted in 1962 by the county
judge of Clinton County to inquire into the refusal of a county hospital ad-
ministrator to relinquish his office after it had been abolished. After being jailed
for contempt for his demeanor during the court of inquiry, the hospital ad-
ministrator, alleging that his civil rights had been violated, sued the county judge
in a federal district court. Mainly on the ground of the judge's judicial immunity,
damages were denied. See Ray v. Huddleston, 212 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Ky.
1963) affd, 327 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1964).
In 1924, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that a circuit court possessed
no jurisdiction to conduct a court of inquiry. Ketcham v. Commonwealth, 204
Ky. 168, 263 S.W. 725 (1924).
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person, held solely for the purpose of discovering commission of
crimes or public offenses and identifying those who may have
committed them.9 It differs from the usual preliminary investiga-
tion, whose purpose it is to determine whether a person already
accused and arrested shall be held for further examination by the
grand jury or proceeded against by information. It differs also
from a legislative or administrative investigation which only
incidentally may discover commission of crime. The pretrial pro-
ceeding is justified on several grounds. First, it may protect in-
nocent persons from arrest and imprisonment on charges based on
frivolous or groundless suspicion."0 Secondly, since it is conducted
by a single judicial officer, it is arguably a more efficient method
for gathering and sifting evidence of commission of crime than
the common law grand jury." Thirdly, if publicly conducted, as
it sometimes is, it may create an aroused public opinion which
could possibly induce an otherwise tardy grand jury into re-
turning indictments. 2 On the other hand, as will be noted later,
the proceeding possesses serious disadvantages, inasmuch as con-
ducting it may result in violation of constitutional rights of the
witnesses testifying before it.'"
Depending upon statutory provision, the proceeding or in-
vestigation may be initiated in various ways. In some states, e.g.
Kentucky and Texas, a judge acting on his own initiative may
begin an investigation, while in several jurisdictions, e.g. Vermont,
Kansas, Arizona, and South Dakota, a judge may act only upon
formal request made by a public prosecutor. Sometimes, as in
Wisconsin, a complaint filed with a judge by an individual may
set the investigative process in motion.
The pretrial proceeding, presided over in some states by a
9 Bryant v. Crossland, 182 Ky. 556, 560-62, 206 S.W. 791, 793-94 (1918);
People v. Birch, 329 Mich. 38,-, 44 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1950); State v. Brady,
18 Utah 2d 434,-, 425 P.2d 155, 157 (1967); State v. Keyes, 75 Wis. 288,-,
44 N.W. 13, 14-15 (1889).
I' State v. Keyes 75 Wis. 288,-, 44 N.W. 13, 15 (1889).
-1 In re Colacasides, 379 Mich. 69,-, 150 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1967).
12 In several states, however, the grand jury is infrequently convened; rather,
indictments are based on information filed by the public prosecutor. Grand jury
indictment, however, remains very much a part of the criminal-judicial process in
Kentucky.
13 See text at Part V, infra. The proceeding is sometimes conducted in a man-
ner which violates the average person's sense of justice or fair play. Inasmuch as
the United States Supreme Court has not ruled that witnesses at the proceeding
are entitled to the same federal constitutional protection of their rights as witnesses
at felony trials, it cannot be said that, from the technical standpoint of consti-
tutional caselaw their constitutional rights are violated.
[Vol. 58
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judge who is not constitutionally required to be an attorney,14
differs considerably from an actual trial in that its procedure,
which is ex parte in nature, is much less formal. This difference is
well illustrated by a United States District Court opinion in a
case involving a Texas Court of Inquiry:
[T]he Court of Inquiry is purely a fact-finding proceeding.
It may issue subpoenas, take testimony, and do nothing else.
There are no parties. There is no accused. No trial is con-
ducted. The Justice of the Peace sitting in this capacity cannot
determine any civil or criminal liability. If the facts de-
veloped indicate that a crime has been committed, the Justice
of the Peace may issue an arrest warrant.' 5
The nature and purpose of a pretrial proceeding is illustrated
further by a Kentucky Court of Appeals' definition of a court of
inquiry as "... . a more or less informal proceeding authorized to
enable the magistrate as an officer of the law to obtain informa-
tion that will enable him to take the necessary steps to institute
criminal action against whomever may have committed a public
offense .... .,'0 The scope of the inquiry, according to the Ken-
tucky Court, is not "... . controlled by the strict rules of evidence
that would prevail in the trial of a case. It may take a wide range
so long as it is directed to the ascertainment of the nature of the
offense or the identity of the offender."17
In some states, it has been held that a judge conducting a
pretrial proceeding acts in a judicial capacity. 8 Although this
view has on occasion been questioned for the reason that the ex-
parte proceeding does not involve a contest between litigants,
' 4 Although the county judge in Kentucky is not constitutionally required to
be an attorney, tfudges in urban counties frequently are attorneys. The judge
Who conducted te court of inquiry in the Lexington-Fayette County Planning
Commission case was an attorney.
15 In re McClelland, 260 F. Supp 182, 184 (S.D. Tex. 1966). Texas has
repealed its statute authorizing the justice of the peace to conduct a court of in-
quiry. judges of count ad districtcut are now empowered to conduct this
proceeding. District judge, but not countr judges, are constitutionally required to
be attorneys. See VExnNoN's TEXAS STAT. ANN., CODE OF CIUM. PROCED., § 52.01
(1965). For a comparison of the pretrial proceeding and the grand jury pro-
ceeding, see text accompanying notes 87-89, infra.
10 Hollen v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 582, 583, 215 S.W. 174 (1919).
17Bryant v. Crossland, 182 Ky. 556, 561, 206 S.W. 791, 794 (1918). "The
extent to which the magistrate may proceed in such examination is within his
discretion." Wis. STAT. ANN., Cnum. P'ocD., § 954.025 (1955).18 In re Slattery, 310 Mich. 458, 17 N.W.2d 251 (1945); State v. Kayes, 75
Wis. 288,-, 44 N.W. 13, 17 (1889). See also Ray v. Huddleston, 212 F. Supp.
843 (W.D. Ky. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1964).
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the essence of the judicial function,"9 it seems not constitutionally
improper to permit a judge to conduct it, inasmuch as it is at least
incident to the judicial function. 20 Evidently, however, a judge
holding a proceeding does not act in a purely judicial capacity,
because investigations can be, and sometimes are, conducted by
administrative agencies, at both the national and state level. In-
vestigations of commission of criminal offenses, moreover, are also
commonly conducted by public prosecutors. Actually, classifica-
tion or definition of the nature of the investigative function of a
pretrial proceeding is almost impossible since governmental
functions cannot be fitted with precision into neat compartments.
It seems probable that a judge conducting a pretrial investigation
acts alternatively in both administrative and judicial capacities. 2 '
In any event, the matter appears of little import for, although it
has been held that a judge cannot conduct an investigation
solely in aid of the executive department,2 2 there is apparently no
decision, federal or state, holding that a state legislature cannot
constitutionally authorize a judge to conduct a pretrial pro-
ceeding.
II. Tim KENTUCY CouRT oF INQUImy
Legislation authorizing the Kentucky court of inquiry appears
to have been first enacted following adoption of Kentucky's third
constitution in 1850.23 Upon declaring the presiding judge of the
19 See especially Gallagher, supra note 6, at 20-21. By holding that, under
the common law, conservators oft the peace possessed authority to conduct
judicial investigations, the Michigan Supreme Court advanced the argument
that a judge conducting an investigation does not act in a non-judicial capacity
in violation of the separation of powers principle. See In re Colacasides, 379
Mich. 69, -, 150 N.W. 2d 1, 11 (1967); In re Slattery, 310 Mich. 458, 17 N.W.
2d 251 (1945). The Michigan Constitution designates judges as conservators of
the peace. See MicH. CoNsT. art. VI, § 29. On the other hand, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, probably correctly, has stated that a judge who is constitutionally
designated a conservator of the peace possesses no inherent authority to conduct
a judicial investigation. See Ketcham v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 168, 175, 263
S.W. 725, 727 (1924).
20 See McCarthy v. Clancy, 110 Conn. 482,-, 148 A. 551, 560 (1930).
21 The Connecticut Supreme Court has said that a judge conducting a pro-
ceeding acts in both an administrative and judicial capacity. McCarthy v. Clancy,
110 Conn. 482,-, 148 A. 551, 558 (1930). The proceedings of military courts
of inquiry have been held to be non-judicial. See note 1 supra.22 1, re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401,-, 150 N.E. 655, 658 (1928). This
opinon was written by Justice Cardozo when a member of the New York Court
OF Agpeals.
3 Gen. Stat. of Ky. 1852, ch. 27, art XVII see 1. It is impossible today to
discover the original legislative intent concerning the nature and purpose of this
(Continued on next page)
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county court a conservator of the peace, this legislation vested
him with "all the powers of a justice in penal and criminal pro-
ceedings, and in a court of inquiry in such proceedings." But,
according to an early opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
interpreting this legislation, the judge could conduct a court of
inquiry only along with another justice of the peace (the county
judge being considered a justice of the peace), because any
recognizance required to be issued as a result of an inquiry had
to be approved by two justices.24 Later, the statute was amended
to permit the county judge acting alone to conduct an inquiry. 5
The present statute provides, "The county judge is a conservator
of the peace within his county, may administer oaths and may
exercise all the powers of a justice in penal and criminal pro-
ceedings, and singly hold a court of inquiry in such pro-
ceedings."26
This brief provision, containing no reference to either the
scope or procedure of an inquiry represents the sole statutory
authority for the holding of a court of inquiry by a Kentucky
county judge. This statute has never been interpreted by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals under the presently effective Consti-
tution of 1891. Instead, all court of inquiry case law has developed
out of judicial interpretations of now repealed section 32 of the
former Criminal Code of Practice, which was derived from section
29 of the Criminal Code of Practice of 1854.27 Repealed section
82, which was last adopted in 1948, authorized investigations of
commission of public offenses by the county judge, the city or
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
court of inquiry, but a reading of the statutes suggests that it was possibly in-
tended as an examing court accusatorial in nature. Section 3 of ch. 27, art. XXIII
of the General Statutes, which was apparently early construed in connection with
the court of inquiry statute, provided, "Two justices have jurisdiction to examine
into all infractions of the penal and criminal laws, the final trial of which is
cognizable in the circuit court, and when proper to send the accused on for
further trial, to commit him to jail, or to allow bail." See Bowman v. Common-
wealth, 58 Ky. (14 Bush) 313 (1854). It should be recalled that earlier Kentucky
military courts of inquiry may have been accusatorial. See note 1 supra.
24 Bowman v. Commonwealth, 53 Ky. (14 Bush) 313 (1854).
2 5 Gen. Stat. of Ky., 1873, ch. 28, art. XIII, sec. 5.
26 Ky. REv. STAT., § 25.150 (1962).
27 The two principal cases interpreting this section are: Hollen v. Com-
monwealth, 185 Ky. 582, 215 S.W. 174 (1919) and Bryant v. Crossland, 182
Ky. 556, 206 S.W. 791 (1918). Section 32 of the Criminal Code of Practice, last
adopted in 1948, was repealed by ch. 234 of the Kentucky Acts of 1962. Al-
though legal action taken under either provision has been infrequent, section 32
has been acted under more often very likely for the reason that the language in
which it is stated makes its purpose more evident.
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police judge -and the justice of the peace. Under the headnote
"Examination of Witnesses to Ascertain Person Guilty of Crime,"
it provided,
A magistrate, if satisfied that a public offense has been com-
mitted, shall have power to summon before him any person he
may think proper for examination on oath concerning it, to
enable him to ascertain the offender, and to issue a warrant
for his arrest.
In opinions interpreting this provision, the Court of Appeals has
used the term "court of inquiry" to denote investigations con-
ducted under it although this now repealed provision par-
adoxically contains no specific reference to a court of inquiry. In-
asmuch as all Kentucky court of inquiry case law rests upon it, and
the only statute which actually authorizes a court of inquiry has
never been interpreted by the Court of Appeals,29 this now re-
pealed statute appears to be the basis for convocation of such
proceedings.
IIl. THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE CouNTr
PLANNING COMMISSION CASE
Because of the state and federal constitutional questions it
raised, most of which are raised by pretrial proceedings generally,
the Fayette County judge's court of inquiry investigation into al-
leged unlawful conduct in connection with the Lexington-Fayette
County Planning Commission seems to possess signal importance.
This court of inquiry was publicly conducted with extensive
coverage of its proceedings by the various news media. Its pro-
cedure, like that of most pretrial proceedings, was ex parte in
28Under the 1854 Criminal Code of Practice, a felony was required rather
than any public offense.
29 In its opinion in the Lexington-Fayette County Planning Commission case,
the Fayette Circuit Court incorrectly states that KRS § 25.150 was construed in
Bryant v. Crossland, and in Hollen v. Commonwealth. Keller v. Johnson, Fayette
Cir. Ct., No. 23208 (August 1968). Repealed section 32 of the Criminal Code
of Practice, rather than KRS § 25.150, was cited in both cases. For more extensive
discussion of the Lexington-Fayette County Planning Commission case, text at
Part IV, infra.
Apparently without examining its legal basis, lower federal courts assume the
constitutionality of the court of inquiry statute. See, e.g., Ray v. Huddleston, 212
F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Ky. 1963); aff'd, 327 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1964). See also
Lynch v. Johnson, F. Cas. No. 19296 (1870). On the other hand, the consti-




nature. Apparently to protect their constitutional rights to counsel
and against self-incrimination, witnesses called to testify were
permitted assistance of counsel, but counsel made no attempt to
examine their own clients or to cross-examine other witnesses.
While the court of inquiry was in session, three witnesses acting
on behalf of themselves and other citizens brought an action in
Fayette Circuit Court seeldng issuance of a writ of prohibition of
further proceedings.
Counsel for plaintiffs seeking the writ stated four principal
reasons why it should be issued: (1) the statute establishing the
court of inquiry is unconstitutional, because of its vagueness and
uncertainty, and because the state constitution does not expressly
authorize a court of inquiry while Section 135 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides that no court save those established by it
may be created; (2) the county judge possesses no authority to
conduct a court of inquiry, inasmuch as in its repeal of section
32 of the former Criminal Code of Practice, which authorized in-
vestigations into commission of public offenses, the General As-
sembly has by implication repealed the court of inquiry statute;
(3) even if the statute is not repealed, it authorizes investigations
only into commission of misdemeanors; and (4) even if the
statute is constitutional, the county judge in conducting the court
was applying it in such a manner as to deprive plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights.30
In rejecting the argument that the court of inquiry statute is
unconstitutional because of its vagueness and uncertainty, the
circuit court first noted that the validity of an inquiry by a judge
authorized to issue warrants for commission of felonies has been
upheld by the state Court of Appeals in at least two cases.3 ' The
circuit court erred, however, in stating that these cases arose
under the court of inquiry statute, since actually they arose under
section 32 of the repealed Criminal Code of Practice, which does
not use the term "court of inquiry."3 2 The circuit court continued
by adding that, if a court of inquiry is conducted according to
30Keller v. Johnson, Fayette Cir. Ct., 1st Div. No. 23208 (1968). The
arguments stated in the text are not in the same order as stated in the court's
opinion.31 Hollen v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 582, 215 S.W. 174 (1919) and Bryant
v. Crossland, 182 Ky. 556, 206 S.W. 781 (1918).
32 See Keller v. Johnson, Fayette Cir Ct., 1st Div., No. 23208 (1968) at
4-5. For the text of both section 32 of th Criminal Code and the court of in-
quiry statute, see text at Part HI, supra.
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the well-settled meaning given to its limits by the law of Ken-
tucky, there is nothing concerning its purpose and procedure
which will render it unconstitutional." Here the court again ap-
pears to confuse the court of inquiry statute with repealed section
32 of the former Criminal Code. Evidently, the "law of Kentucky"
referred to is the case law arising from repealed section 32. As
earlier noted, the court of inquiry statute merely creates a court of
inquiry; it prescribes neither its procedure nor the scope of its
investigatory authority. Since the court of inquiry statute itself
has never been judicially interpreted, there exists no "law of
Kentucky" stemming from it prescribing the purpose and pro-
cedure of a court of inquiry.
By adopting the view, perhaps correctly, that a court of in-
quiry conducting an investigation is acting in a capacity similiar
to that of an administrative agency conducting an investigation
such as those frequently authorized by statute in Kentucky and
other states, the circuit court denied the argument that a court of
inquiry is a court and thus rejected the argument that it is
statutorily established in violation of the Kentucky Constitution's
prohibition of courts not enumerated therein.34
The circuit court also ruled in the negative on the argument
that a county judge possesses no statutory authority to conduct a
court of inquiry, because repeal of section 32 of the former
Criminal Code of Practice has the effect of repealing by implica-
tion the court of inquiry statute. It noted first that courts do not
favor repeal of statutes by implication; and, secondly, called at-
tention to the fact that another statute [Kentucky Revised
Statutes § 432.260 (2) (1962)] recognizes the existence of a court
of inquiry by limiting its contempt powers. Taking the view that
neither of these two statutes is repealed, and that they can stand
by themselves, the court ruled that the county judge possesses
authority to conduct a court of inquiry."
To the contention that the court of inquiry statute authorizes
investigations only into commission of misdemeanors, the circuit
court, relying largely on judicial interpretation of section 32 of
the repealed Criminal Code of Practice, ruled that the right of the
county judge to inquire into commission of felonies is incident to





his authority to issue arrest warrants.36 Actually the court of in-
quiry statute does not specifically mention the type of crimes or
public offenses a court may investigate. However, it does appear
clearly to give the judge authority to conduct a court of inquiry
in penal and criminal proceedings. Inasmuch as it includes no
language to suggest that investigations must be limited to mis-
demeanors, it seems quite logical to conclude that it would per-
mit inquiries into commission of felonies.
Although it made no binding declaration or flnding of fact
that, in conducting the court of inquiry, the county judge had
actually deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, the
circuit court noted the widespread publicity attending its pro-
ceedings and issued a limited restraining order against the county
judge's holding the inquiry in public.37 Taking the somewhat
questionable view that a court of inquiry proceedings is the same
type of inquisitorial proceeding as that of a grand jury pro-
ceeding,38 the court directed the county judge to conduct it in
secret. After conducting the inquiry the judge could either issue
arrest warrants against those whom he had reason to believe
guilty of public offenses or present evidence of commission of
such offenses to the grand jury. 9
No appeal to the state Court of Appeals was taken from the
ruling of the circuit court. Following it, the county judge con-
tinued to conduct the court of inquiry in secret as directed by
the circuit court. He later presented to the grand jury evidence
alleging commission of public offenses, but it returned no in-
dictments."
IV. TBE FAYETrE CmcurrCouTIT's DECISION ANALYZED
A. Constitutionality of the Court of Inquiry Statute
There appears some merit to the argument advanced by plain-
tiffs in the Lexington-Fayette County Planning Commission case
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. Concerning the difference between a grand jury proceeding and a pre-
trial proceeding, see text accompanying notes 87-89, infra.
3
9 Keller v. Johnson, Fayette Cir. Ct., 1st Div., No. 23208 (1968).40 Two indictments resulted from the court of inquiry, both of which were
apparently based on evidence gathered while the inquiry was publicly conducted.
A trial based on one of these indictments was held under a change of venue in
(Continued on next page)
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that, due to its vagueness and uncertainty, the court of inquiry
statute is unconstitutional.41 Indeed, since it has not been in-
terpreted by the state Court of Appeals, its meaning, apart from
judicial interpretation accorded section 82 of the repealed Crim-
inal Code of Practice, an entirely different provision, is unknown.
The undoubted purpose of repealed section 82 is that of author-
izing a judge to conduct an investigation to determine whether an
arrest warrant shall be issued. Although the court of inquiry
statute may possess the same meaning and purpose, the Court of
Appeals has never in any case before it said as much. Indeed, the
origin of the court of inquiry statute is surrounded by consi-
derable mystery; and, although it has long existed, there appears
to have been very little judicial awareness that it authorizes
the county judge to conduct a court of inquiry.4 Further, no
certain evidence exists to prove beyond doubt that, when
originally enacted following adoption of Kentucky's third consti-
tution in 1850, it was intended to authorize a purely fact-finding
tribunal as a court of inquiry or what is ordinarily conceived to-
day as a pretrial proceeding. It may have been intended to be
accusatorial. Military courts of inquiry authorized earlier in Ken-
tucky, from which the present-day court of inquiry evidently
derives its name, do appear to have been accusatorial and ap-
parently functioned much like trial court.43 Opinions in the two
principal court of inquiry cases decided by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals cite section 82 of the repealed Criminal Code of
Practice rather than the court of inquiry statute itself as authority
for holding a court of inquiry.44 In one of these opinions, the ap-
pellate court noted that without section 32 of the Criminal Code
there can be no court of inquiry since "... . it is the only statute
we have authorizing a court of inquiry to be held."45 Further, in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the ci r of Nicholasville, some fifteen miles from Lexington. It resulted in a
"hung' jury and the charge was later dismissed. No trial based on the second
indictment has been conducted. Assuming the correctness of the circuit court's
ruling that the inquiry must be secret, the argument can perhaps be made the
evidence collected while it was publicly conducted is inadmissible in court.
41 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
42 See infra this section.
43 See note 1 supra. Whatever may have been the original legislative intent
concerning the purpose of the court of inquiry, if it were regarded as an actual
court today its existence would violate Ky. CONST. § 135.
44 See note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
45 Bryant v. Crossland, 182 Ky. 556, 559-60, 206 S.W. 791, 793 (1918).
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a 1963 opinion of a federal district court involving a court of in-
quiry conducted by a county judge, section 32 of the former code
rather than the court of inquiry statute is cited as sanctioning the
inquiry. However, in its opinion in that case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals cites both statutes as authority for courts of inquiry.46
It seems unfortunate also that Kentucky Court of Appeals
opinions have used the term "court of inquiry" to denote in-
vestigations conducted under section 32, even though that statute
does not include the expression. Such designation may have
tended to create confusion leading to the belief that section 32
and the court of inquiry statute possess the same meaning and
purpose. This is a matter which, if the court of inquiry statute
remains unamended, will have to be resolved eventually by the
state Court of Appeals.
B. Absence of Specified Inquiry Scope and Procedure
Whether the fact that the court of inquiry statute does not
prescribe procedure for conducting an investigation or place
limits on its scope is sufficient to invalidate it is a question which
only the state Court of Appeals, or perhaps a federal court, can
answer.47 In most states, statutes authorizing proceedings similar
to the court of inquiry are exceedingly vague concerning scope of
investigatory authority, procedures, and rights of witnesses. Per-
haps due to pressure of public opinion, and also to fear that they
might be invalidated by federal courts, Texas, Wisconsin, and
Michigan have amended their statutes to grant witnesses the right
to counsel; but in the latter two states counsel is authorized only
for the purpose of enabling them to assert their constitutional
right against self-incrimination. 8 Texas now grants witnesses the
same rights as witnesses testifying at felony trials. If the court of
inquiry is to continue to be authorized in Kentucky, the General
Assembly should enact legislation prescribing its procedure,
placing limits upon the scope of its investigatory authority, and
specifying rights of witnesses. But apart from consideration of
these important matters, a court of inquiry conducted today by
46Ray v. Huddleston, 327 F.2d 61, 62, (6th Cir. 1964).
47 Cf. State v. Brady, 18 Utah 2d 434, -, 425 P.2d 155, 157 (1967).
48 See note 2 supra. The Kentucky Attorney General has ruled that witnesses
at a court of inquiry are entitled to representation by counsel. Op. ATTY. GEN.
No. 34031, January 14, 1954. See also note 84 infra.
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a county judge in Kentucky appears to rest upon a nebulous
and precarious legal foundation. The question of the consti-
tutionality of the statute authorizing it can be finally determined
only by the state Court of Appeals.
C. Public or Secret Proceeding?
Apart from the question of the constitutionality of the court
of inquiry statute, the question remains whether the Fayette
Circuit Court was correct in its ruling that a court of inquiry
proceeding, like a grand jury proceeding, must be conducted in
secret.49 This ruling may be in error, inasmuch as the court of in-
quiry statute does not specifically require secrecy. Although the
secrecy question has never been for decision directly before the
state Court of Appeals, there is no suggestion in any of its
opinions that an inquiry must be conducted in secret. On the
other hand, its opinions indicate that all inquiries conducted
thus far have been public. Moreover, in the Attorney General's
official opinion, a court of inquiry can be held either publicly or
privately in the discretion of the judge.50 Some other state
supreme courts which have examined this question have con-
curred with the Kentucky Attorney General. 1 A Wisconsin statute
expressly empowers a judge to conduct it either in public or in
private.
52
A Texas proceeding is required to be public, with witnesses
statutorily granted the same rights when testifying as witnesses
at felony trials. 3 Inasmuch as grand jury proceedings are always
required to be secret, judicial rulings in some other states that, in
the absence of an express secrecy requirement, the proceeding
may be public appear logical.
4 9 See notes 37 and 38 supra, and accompanying text.
50 Op. Arry. GEN. No. 43463, July 15, 1959.
51 In re Ferris, 175 Kan. 704,-, 267 P.2d 190, 197 (1954); Ex parte
Jimenez, 159 Tex. 183,--, 317 S.W.2d 189, 195 (1958); McClelland v. Briscoe,
359 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); State ex rel. Kowaleski v. Dist.
Court of Milwaukee County, 254 Wis. 363, 36 N.W.2d 419 (1949). Although the
Kansas statute is silent on the matter, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that an
inquiry may be conducted in secret. It has been said that "John Doe" (pretrial)
proceedings should be oen hearings and in this they are distinguishable from a
grand jury investigation.' Letter from C. J. Kelley, Assistant Attorney General,
State of South Dakota, to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, (October 9, 1968).5
2 See note 2 supra.




In the recent case of Kennedy v. Justice of the District Court
of Dukes County,54 however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court ruled that the judicial inquest into the death of Mary
Jo Kopeehne, an inquisitorial proceeding, different from but still
very similar to a pretrial proceeding, had to be conducted in
secret.5 This ruling was made despite a Massachusetts statute
which provides that a judge conducting such an inquest may ex-
clude "all persons not required by law to attend."56 Although the
United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the secrecy
question,"7 the ruling of the Fayette Circuit Court and the Mas-
sachusetts court appear to have been made for the purpose of
preventing undue pretrial publicity. If these rulings should
eventually be adopted by the Supreme Court, they could cast
doubt upon the legality of statutes of some states, such as Wis-
consin's, which give a judge discretion to hold a public pro-
ceeding.
The problem of excessive pretrial publicity which may pre-
judice the right of a person later indicted to a fair trial is one
not admitting of easy solution. It has been said that pretrial
publicity can be even more harmful than publicity during an
actual trial, inasmuch as it can establish in the public mind the
question of guilt or innocence of a person later accused.58 Courts,
54 252 N.W.2d 201 (Mass. 1969).
55 Id. at 207.
56 ANN. LAws oF MAss., ch. 38, § 8 (1966). The ruling in the Kennedy case
requiring the judicial inquest to be conducted in secret appears contrary to the
general rule that, where a statute does not specifically require secrecy, the judge
conducting a hearing or inquest has discretion to determine whether it be public
or private. See note 51 supra, and accompanying text. Prior to the decision in the
Kennedy case, some Massachusetts inquests had been public, while others had
been private. Kennedy v. Dist. Court of Dukes County, 252 N.E.2d 201, 205
(Mass. 1969).
It is also interesting that the Massachusetts inquest statute is very similar
to the Ohio statute authorizing the State Fire Marshall to conduct an inquiry
relative to the origin of a fire. This latter statute provides that, in conducting an
investigation, "The marshall may exclude... all persons other than those required
to be present .... PAGE'S Osno REV. CODE § 3737.13 (1954).
In the case of In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), the Ohio State Fire
Marshall, rather than the Ohio Supreme Court, made the decision to conduct a
secret inquiry. It seems very possible that the Massachusetts court's decision
relative to secrecy is tantamount to judicial legislation. The same can also be
said for the secrecy ruling of the Fayette Circuit Court in the Lexington-Fayette
County Planning Commission case.
57 In his memorandum in the case of Martin v. Texas, 382 U.S. 928 (1965),
in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Chief Justice Warren does, how-
ever mention Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), a case widely noted for its
condemnation of pretrial publicity.58 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965).
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of course, have a duty to take adequate precautions to prevent
excessive publicity. Under most circumstances, prejudicial effects
of pretrial publicity can be lessened or removed by change in the
time and place of trial and by judicious selection of jurors.59
Moreover, even though the state itself causes prejudicial publicity
by publicly conducting a proceeding, it has the right, absent
constitutional provisions to the contrary, to request a change of
venue for conducting a later trial, inasmuch as the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution does not guarantee to a person accused of a crime the
right to be tried in the jurisdiction wherein it is alleged to have
been committed. 0
V. INHERENT DIFFICuLTIEs IN CONDUCTiNG TE
PRETRIAL PROCEEDING
Although the pretrial proceeding may serve the useful purpose
of protecting the innocent from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment,
conducting it either in public or private usually involves serious
federal constitutional questions, only some of which have been
decided by the United States Supreme Court.6 Moreover, no
single case involving all questions raised by conducting it has
ever been before the Court for decision.(2 Some of these ques-
r Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333. 352-53 (1966); Martin v. Beto, 397
F.2d 741, 749 (5th Cir. 1968).60 Martin v. Beto, 897 F.2d 741, 748 (5th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel.
Chatary v. Nailon, 211 F. Supp. 676, 678 (E. D. Pa. 1962).
61 A witness at a secret investigation conducted by a state fire marshall is
not constitutionally entitled to representation by counsel. In re Groban, 352 U.S.
330 (1957). A judge conducting a secret pretrial proceeding cannot charge a
witness with contempt and try him therein. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Accord Courtney v. Schroeder, 348 U.S. 933 (1955). A judge holding a witness
in contempt for his conduct during a secret pretrial proceeding cannot himself
later try the witness on the charge. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). The
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution grants a witness at a pretrial proceeding the right against self-in-
crimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
62 In a now famous memorandum denying certiorari simply because four
justices did not vote to grant it in a case involving a Texas court of inquiry pro-
ceeding, Chief Justice Warren commented, 'It is clear that grave constitutional
questions are raised by conducting such a proceeding." Martin v. Texas, 382
U.S. 928 (1965). The statute under which this court of inquiry was conducted
has since been amended. See notes 97 and 98 infra, and accompanying text.
Most questions involved in conducting the proceeding are raised in the recent
case of Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969). This case involved a
Louisiana statute establishing a Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry to
investigate facts concerning criminal violations of Louisiana and United States
labor laws. The Supreme Court made no decision in the case but remanded it to
(Continued on next page)
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tions, however, have been decided in cases involving investiga-
tions conducted by state and federal administrative agencies.63
Conducting the proceeding presents a constitutional dilemma,
inasmuch as witnesses testifying before it do not possess the
same federal constitutional protection of their rights as do ac-
cused persons on trial. They are not granted this protection be-
cause this ex parte proceeding is supposedly conducted only for
fact-finding purposes." As one federal district court said, "[i]n
the range of constitutional permissiveness a clear distinction exists
between a mere investigatory proceeding on the one hand and a
judicial or adjudicatory one on the other."65 Since witnesses at a
proceeding are not accused and are not on trial, it has never been
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution entitles them to the right to as-
sistance of counsel,6 6 the right to confront and cross-examine
their accusers, or the right to introduce evidence on their own
behalf.
67
Absence of these federal constitutional protections can have
serious consequences, for without them witnesses can render
themselves liable to later criminal prosecution.6 Although state
statutory provisions differ as to procedures for conducting the
proceeding and rights accorded witneses therein, witnesses some-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the District Court for trial. In his dissent in this case, Justice Harlan commented,
"The prevailing opinion appears understandably reluctant to commit itself to very
much." Id. at 438.
63 Witnesses before the U.S. Civil Rights Commission investigating violations
of voting rights have no right to confront and cross-examine their accusers.
Counsel is permitted only for advisory purposes. Hannah v. Larche 363 U.S. 420
(1960). Witnesses at a secret state judicial inquiry into improper practices of the
local bar have no right to counsel. Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S.
287 (1959).
64 See text at Part I, supra. Although the pretrial proceeding is considered
non-accusatorial, when the testimony of several witnesses points the finger of
guilt toward a specific person, he can become an accused without actually being
made a defendant. See Ex parte Smith, 383 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Cr. App.
1964).65 Martin v. Beto, 260 F. Supp. 589, 595 (S.D. Tex. 1966).66 1n re Croban, 352. U.S. 330 (1957); See also text at Part V, Section A,
infra.67 See text accompanying note 83 infra. Concerning the evils occasioned by
conducting the grand jury in public without witnesses being permitted to con-
front and cross-examine their accusers, see text accompanying note 87 infra.
68 Inasmuch as the sole purpose of the pretrial proceeding is the apprehension
of criminals, and since it is an integral part of the state's machinery for the ad-
ministration of justice, the argument can plausibly be advanced that witnesses ap-
pearing before it ought to be afforded all the protection the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution gives criminal defendants. Cf. Martin v. Beto, 397
F.2d 741, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1968).
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times are not granted the aforementioned rights. Further, when a
proceeding is publicly conducted, with representatives of the var-
ious news media present, sufficient harm may be done to the
reputation and character of a person later accused and indicted as
will make a fair and impartial trial very difficult, if not impossible.
Assuming the constitutionality, if not always the wisdom, of
the pretrial proceeding, it is sometimes conducted in such
fashion as to offend the conscience of those concerned with the
guarantee of due process of law. As an illustration, one witness
was refused the right to assistance of counsel, and was not per-
mitted to confront and cross-examine his accusers while forced
to testify for some four days at a public pretrial proceeding with
representatives of the various news media present. 9 On another
occasion, a witness, who was without representation of counsel
at a secret proceeding, was charged with contempt and tried in
the proceeding by a judge who considered his answers false and
evasive."0 Consequently, questions are logically raised concerning
how this proceeding, if authorized at all, should be conducted to
accomplish its intended purpose of obtaining evidence to de-
termine whether an arrest warrant should be issued, while not
violating what those with an innate sense of justice ordinarily
consider fundamental rights.
Experience amply demonstrates that, unless proper pre-
cautions are taken, violation of these rights can occur whether
the proceeding be publicly or privately conducted. If it is publicly
conducted, a witness not accorded the right through counsel to
confront and cross-examine his accusers not only may be indicted
on criminal charges, but also may suffer such irreparable damage
to his character and reputation as will prejudice his right to a fair
trial. There are, however, some serious practical objections to
conducting a public proceeding with witnesses being granted the
right to confront and cross-examine their accusers. However
desirable granting this right may be-and it seems essential to
protecting the integrity of the fact-finding process-it would alter
the proceeding's ex parte nature by converting it into a proceeding
somewhat similar to that of a formal trial. It has therefore been
urged with considerable logic that granting this right would
69 See Martin v. Texas, 382 U.S. 928, 929 (1965).
70 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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hamper the conduct of the proceeding. In the language of Chief
Justice Warren, it "... would make a shambles of the investigation
and stifle the agency in its gathering of facts." 1 Conducting it in
this fashion also possesses the additional disadvantage of re-
quiring a person later indicted to undergo, in substance, virtually
two trials.
Considering the disadvantages associated with conducting a
public proceeding, a private proceeding appears much preferable,
provided witnesses are granted assistance of counsel to protect
their fundamental rights. But it should be recalled that the
United States Supreme Court has not as yet ruled that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment entitles witnesses in
such proceedings to assistance of counsel. This seemingly funda-
mental right is assured by statute in only a few states. 2
A. The Right to Counsel
Since protection of all other constitutional rights vitally de-
pend upon it, the right to assistance of counsel is the most im-
portant of all rights required by a witness at a pretrial proceeding;
yet, as previously noted, the Supreme Court has never interpreted
the due process clause to require this right. Only when a person
is actually accused of a specific crime is he constitutionally en-
titled to representation by counsel.73 But without counsel present
to assist him at the pretrial inquiry, a witness incurs the risk of
having his constitutional rights violated because the average
person, grossly ignorant of judicial procedure as well as his con-
stitutional rights, is in no position to defend himself. Not only
may he be unable to assert his undoubted constitutional right
against self-incrimination, but also his testimony given without
guidance of counsel may lead him into the charge of contempt.
Further, if the proceeding is conducted in secret, without the
presence of counsel to corroborate his account of his testimony,
he runs the risk of having the judge conducting it giving an incor-
7 1 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 444 (1960). This statement is made in
an opinion involving an investigation conducted by the U.S. Civil Rights Com-
mission, but it seems applicable equally to a pretrial proceeding. See also note 83
infra, and accompanying text.
72 See text of Part V, section A, infra.




rect, or even false, version of it. 4 Once he is formally charged
following the proceeding, assistance of counsel at the formal trial
may, then, avail him little, for as Justice Black has said, "The right
to assistance of counsel at the formal trial is a very hollow thing
when, for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured
by the pretrial examination." 5
Assistance of counsel for witnesses at the proceeding not only
would protect their constitutional rights, but also would enhance
the integrity of the judicial fact-finding process.76 Although the
United States Supreme Court has never ruled counsel necessary
for witnesses, there appears to be a growing recognition of the
necessity for it. Evidently, in some instances, such as in the Lex-
ington-Fayette County Planning Commission case, the court con-
ducting the proceeding authorized counsel. 7 Further, as noted
previously, it is currently authorized by statute in Texas, Michi-
gan, and Wisconsin, in the latter two states its expressed purpose
being primarily that of enabling witnesses to exercise their consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination. It seems significant also
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in the Ken-
nedy case that, while testifying, witnesses at the secret judicial
inquest into the death of Mary Jo Kopechne were entitled to be
accompanied and advised by counsel. 78
Although no precise reason can be assigned for the refusal
thus far of the Supreme Court to rule that the due process clause
entitles witnesses at the pretrial proceeding to counsel,79 its
refusal to enter such a ruling may be because the proceeding is
considered only fact-finding and not accusatorial in nature, and
74 Cf. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 380, 341-
53 (1957).
75 Id. at 344.
76 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436 ,466 (1966).
17 The Kentucky Attorney General has ruled that witneses at a Kentucky
court of inquiry are entitled to representation by counsel. OF. ATY. GEN. No.
84031, Jan. 14, 1954.78 Kennedy v. Justice of the Dist. Court of Dukes County, 252 N.E.2d
201, 207 (Mass. 1969).
79 Perhaps the simplest and most obvious reason is that there has never been
on the Court at any one time five justices who believed that this right ought to
be authorized. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), it should be noted, was
decided by a 5-4 vote. Some public prosecutors may prefer to question witnesses
who are without representation of counsel. At least, it has been reported that the
grand jury, before which one does not have a constitutional right to counsel has
been more frequently used in Wisconsin since that state authorized counsel for
witnesses at the pretrial proceeding. Letter from Robert W. Warren, Attorney
General of Wisconsin, to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Feb. 3, 1969.
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because counsel for witnesses is not permitted at the common
law grand jury proceeding. But, although sometimes compared
with it, 80 it has never been held that a pretrial inquiry is on a par
with a grand jury proceeding.8' Indeed, in addition to the fact
that some states authorize counsel for witnesses at the pretrial
proceeding but never for witnesses at the grand jury proceeding,
there are several other signficant differences between the two
types of proceedings. As previously noted, the pretrial proceeding
is sometimes public, but the grand jury proceeding is always
secret. The inquiry is conducted by a single judge holding a
definite term of public office, but the common law grand jury
consists of some twelve to twenty-three members drawn some-
what randomly from the community at large. Since its members
serve only temporarily, and possess no official connection with
the administration of justice, the grand jury is more likely to be
less biased in its investigation of crimes or public offenses than a
judge conducting a pretrial proceeding. Although witnesses
testifying before the grand jury are not constitutionally entitled
to representation by counsel, it is extremely unlikely that a public
prosecutor meeting with the grand jury can take advantage of
them or violate their constitutional rights; because grand jurors,
selected as they are, usually possess sufficient notions of justice as
not to tolerate such conduct. Moreover, they are likely to report
it publicly if it does occur.82 This situation is in marked contrast
to the possible circumstances arising from a secret proceeding held
by a single man, though a judicial officer, conducting an in-
quistion of a witness not represented by counsel.
Since there actually exists a vast difference between a pretrial
proceeding and a grand jury proceeding, it would seem altogether
appropriate for the Supreme Court to reverse its previous ruling
by holding that, in order to afford them constitutional protection
of their rights, witnesses at a pretrial proceeding, whether public
or private, are entitled to representation by counsel.
8 0 In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 332-33, (1957); In re Ferris, 175 Kan. 704,
267 P.2d 190, 197 (1954); See State v. Smith, 56 S. D. 238,-, 228 N.W. 240,
248 (1929).81 United States v. Crumble, 331 F.2d 228, 231 (7th Cir. 1964); State ex rel.
Alford v. Thorson, 202 Wis. 31,-, 231 N.W. 155, 156 (1930).82 Cf. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 346-
47 (1957).
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B. The Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses
Largely because of its ex parte nature, witnesses at a pre-
trial proceeding are not permitted to confront and cross-examine
their accusers save in Texas where the right is now authorized
by statute. Indeed, as Chief Justice Warren said for the court
in Hannah v. Larche, "[W]e think it is fairly clear . . . that
witnesses appearing before investigatory agencies, whether
legislative, executive, or judicial, have generally not been ac-
corded the rights of apprisal, confrontation, or cross-examina-
tion." 3 Although recognizing as Chief Justice Warren points out
that the right to confrontation and cross-examination can im-
pair or stifle an investigatory proceeding,84 the fact remains never-
theless that granting it to witnesses at a pretrial examination con-
cerned with sifting evidence involving commission of crime can
not only serve to prevent damage to character and reputation,
but also can aid in discovery of fact and truth.85 Indeed, unless
this right is granted, a witness at a public pretrial examination is
more or less at the mercy of any person whom the state chooses
to have testify against him. Although testimony taken under such
circumstances may not necessarily lead to later criminal pro-
secution, it can result in ruination of reputation and character.
The case against a public ex parte investigation of commission
of crime is forcefully stated in an 1873 ruling by Chief Justice
Pearson of the North Carolina Supreme Court that a grand jury
proceeding cannot be conducted in public.8" In his opinion Chief
Justice Pearson commented:
If the man is to be exposed without inquiry as to the suf-
ficiency of the evidence, to the scandal and disgrace of a
trial in public, it may well be done on the information of the
State's Solicitor; for the protection of a grand jury amounts
to nothing if the citizen is to be first exposed to scandal and
disgrace by a public examination of the witnesses on the part
of the State, in order to see whether he ought to be exposed to
83 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 449 (1960).
84 See note 71 supra, and accompanying text.
85 Cf. Note, Confrontation and Cross-Examination in Federal Administrative
Procedure, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 206, 218 (1960). Justice Clark, in Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965), made the comment that the "chief function of our
judicial machinery is to ascertain the truth." Truth, it seems, cannot be dis-
covered when only one side-the State-is heard.
86 State v. Branch, 68 N.C. 133 (1873).
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the scandal and disgrace of being tried in public on a criminal
charge; and, if upon the public examination of the witnesses
for the State, he has no right to cross-examine and no right
to offer witnesses to contradict the witnesses of the State,
or to prove their bad character, and to be defended by
counsel, it would be better for him to have a trial at once,
upon information, where he has the right 'to confront the ac-
cusers and witnesses with other testimony and to have counsel
for his defence' instead of being in the first place, put in the
condition of a victim tied to a stake, while his reputation is
being tortured to death. If the witnesses for the State are to be
examined in public. .. in all fairness the accused should be
allowed to cross-examine and to offer witnesses to contradict
or explain, and to have the benefit of counsel.
87
Although a grand jury proceeding and a pretrial proceeding
are admittedly different, the same kind of injury to character and
reputation which can result from conducting a grand jury pro-
ceeding in public can also come from publicly conducting a pre-
trial proceeding. Although its decision may amount to judicial
legislation, it seems that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court acted wisely when it held that the judicial inquest in the
Kennedy case had to be conducted in secret. Moreover, the same
can be said for the Fayette Circuit Court's decision that the court
of inquiry investigation in the Lexington-Fayette County Plan-
ning Commission case had to be conducted in secret. It seems
that, if the pretrial proceeding is publicly conducted, witnesses
appearing before it should be granted the same constitutional
rights as witnesses at felony trials, inasmuch as granting these
rights would not only impede conducting it, but also would
require a witness later indicted to endure the equivalent of two
trials. A serious question thus exists concerning the wisdom and
desirability of publicly conducting the proceeding.
88
VI. GENEAL CONCLUDING OBSEaVATIONS
Perhaps the principal argument for the pretrial proceeding, as
compared with the grand jury, is its allegedly greater efficiency
87 Id., at 135.
88 If conducted in secret with witnesses granted the right to counsel for the
purpose of protecting their right against self-incrimination, a proceeding could
(Continued on next page)
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in gathering and sifting evidence of commission of public of-
fenses. Still, the conduct of this proceeding, which is authorized
in only a few states, has caused so much abuse of ordinarily ac-
cepted constitutional rights that there may be sound reason to
seriously question its usefulness and desirability as an investiga-
tory device. Since they were enacted during either the last
century or the first quarter of the present century, statutes of
most states, Kentucky included, authorizing this proceeding sti-
pulate very little concerning either its investigatory procedure or
rights of witnesses testifying therein. The Kentucky statute, for
example, merely authorizes the county judge, who frequently is
not an attorney, to conduct a court of inquiry without prescribing
any formal rules or guidelines for holding it. In an inquiry
authorized under a statute, particularly one conducted by a judge
who is not an attorney, anything can occur leading to violation
of constitutional rights.89 Such a possibility indeed causes pause
to believers in due process of law.
Largely because the proceeding is considered non-accusatorial
and ex parte in nature, the United States Supreme Court, though
holding that witnesses testifying before it are entitled to federal
constitutional protection against self-incrimination, has never
ruled that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
entitles them to the right to assistance of counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine their accusers, or the right to in-
troduce evidence on their own behalf. However, the right to as-
sistance of counsel is granted by statute in Texas, Michigan, and
Wisconsin, but in the latter two states it is granted only for the
purpose of assertion of the right against self-incrimination.
Depending upon statutory provision, the proceeding may be
conducted either in public or in secret. When it is publicly con-
ducted, unless a witness is granted virtually the same constitu-
tional rights as a witness testifying at a felony trial, particularly
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
be conducted without violation of constitutional rights. On the other hand, there
is question whether the proceeding could accomplish more than an investigation
conducted by a grand jury.
89 In North Dakota, save in an instance where a person is likely to flee his
jurisdiction, a county justice, who is not constitutionally required to be an at-
torney, cannot after a hearing issue an arrest warrant without the approval of
the State's attorney. N. D. CErr. CODE § 29-05-06 (1960). Although the pretrial
proceeding is usually considered nonaccusatorial, a witness before it can become
an accused without actually becoming a defendant. See note 64 supra.
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the right through counsel to confront and cross-examine his ac-
cusers, the possibility exists that publicity engendered by con-
ducting it will prejudice the right of any witness later indicted
to a fair trial. If it is conducted in secret, a witness without
counsel incurs the risk of having his constitutional rights violated
by the judge conducting it. Undoubtedly, assistance of counsel is
the most vital right needed by a witness, because assertion of all
other constitutional rights depends upon it. Unless counsel is per-
mitted by statute, however, to assert these constitutional rights
which are ordinarily granted witnesses at felony trials, a witness
runs the risk of having them violated.
Considering the problems and difficulties thus encountered
by conducting it, it seems that the proceeding should either be
reformed or otherwise abolished. It is noteworthy that it is not
authorized and does not function in the vast majority of states,
which appear none the worse by its absence. Further, when
authorized without proper constitutional safeguards, it is fraught
with possible judicial mischief, particularly if conducted by a
judge without legal training, and can possibly produce more harm
than good. The Texas state bar's suggested criminal code recom-
mended aboltion of courts of inquiry,90 but the Texas legislature
enacted legislation designed to improve it. As originally enacted,
this legislation empowered district judges who are constitutionally
required to be attorneys to conduct it, and provided that wit-
nesses be granted the same rights as witnesses testifying at felony
trails.9 Since the Texas proceeding is required by statute to be
conducted in public, the right of a witness through counsel to
confront and cross-examine his accusers will likely protect its
fact-finding integrity. But this legislation, though protecting con-
stitutional rights, seems to place a witness later indicted in the
position of having to endure two public trials. This appears to
represent questionable public policy. The passage of more time
is required before the wisdom of this legislation can be fully
evaluated.
The public interest might be as well served and individual
9oBowman Burleson, and Jones, Peace Officers and Texas' New Code of
Criminal Procedure, 17 BAYLOR L. REv. 268, 299 (1965).
91 TEx s Acrs 1965, Ch. 722. In 1967, this act was amended to authorize
county judges, who are not constitutionally required to be attorneys, to conduct
courts of inquiry. TEXAS ACTS 1967, ch. 659, § 34.
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liberties better protected if courts of inquiry were abolished. 2
Responsibility for conducting investigations of commission of
crimes or public offenses should be vested solely in the public
prosecutor and in the grand jury. That ancient institution the
grand jury, though certainly capable of being improved in areas
where it is often criticized, tardiness and inefficiency in per-
forming its investigatory duties, has not failed. Since time has
proved it a generally careful and zealous guardian of individual
liberties, perhaps it should be the only official agency authorized
to conduct investigations of commission of crime.
92 As evidenced by the fact that they have amended rather than repealed
their statutes, the legislatures of Texas, Michigan and Wisconsin apparently
believe the pretrial proceeding a useful device in the discovery of crime. For
reasons stated in this article, however, the author does not share their view.
